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Politicizing Environmental Science Does
Not Mean Denying Climate Science Nor
Endorsing It Without Question
•
Tim Forsyth
There is an unfortunate tendency in some environmental debates to portray the
debate about climate change denial in moralistic terms without seeing how this
approach simpliªes climate risks and limits debate. In turn, this position is
sometimes connected to two further ill-starred beliefs: of justifying climate sci-
ence because science, per se, is uninºuenced by society and hence beyond re-
proach; or that the struggle for better environmental policy can be represented
by a binary divide between valiant green campaigners who command the truth,
and obstinate individualists who do not.
Climate change policies deserve better. And so too, for that matter, do de-
bates within global environmental politics about how to incorporate scientiªc
knowledge into global policy.
In this brief paper, I complement the earlier statements of Gert Goeminne
and Peter Jacques by arguing three key points. First, the resistance to climate sci-
ence from so-called deniers cannot be explained by drawing an imaginary line
between two ªelds of science and politics and then investigating each for mal-
functions. Rather, political analysis needs to pay more attention to how scien-
tiªc knowledge and politics inºuence each other, and adjusting political analy-
sis to account for this kind of coproduction. Second, one key element of this
political analysis is to assess which actors, and which notions of environmental
risk, are empowered or excluded from public debates and scientiªc research (on
this I agree with Gert Goeminne). Third, this assessment should also consider
how political critiques of denial—such as linking it to moral judgments about
economic growth or to Holocaust denial—also create exclusions that reduce
discussion about how to reduce emissions and vulnerability (here, I disagree
with Peter Jacques).
Politicizing Science
The preceding papers demonstrate different approaches to the relationship be-
tween science and politics. Goeminne uses debates from science and technology
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studies (STS) to argue that “translating scientiªc matters of fact into political
matters of concern constitutes ªrst and foremost a political struggle about what
to be concerned about in the ªrst place.” Goeminne describes STS as a “con-
structivist” approach because it acknowledges political inºuences on truth
claims. Yet, the word “constructivist” can be misleading if it suggests that knowl-
edge has no meaning outside of those inºuences. Accordingly, Goeminne pro-
poses the notion of “composition” to indicate that scientiªc facts have explana-
tory value—but only in relation to those matters of concern that gave rise to
them. Goeminne’s ªrst-order claim, therefore, is that scientiªc knowledge al-
ways reºects values and perspectives. His second-order claim is that there will
inevitably be exclusions in how facts are generated, which can reduce science’s
relevance to concerns not included in their composition. Such arguments have
been made in some classic STS texts,1 but also in some speciªc analyses of sci-
entiªc explanation concerning environmental problems such as deforestation,
soil erosion, and desertiªcation.2
Jacques, however, emphasizes the normative purpose of science. He cites
Paul Sears’ 1964 statement that ecology is a “subversive science” because it
could “challenge the central workings of modern society,” adding, “climate
change science provides an imminent critique of industrial power, Western mo-
dernity, and the ideals of Western progress.” He also uses the powerful meta-
phor of the Holocaust as a pre-existing debate about how and why denial oc-
curs, but also as a theory of how the “organized deºection of accountability is
driven by a movement aimed at defending an ideology.” Jacques spends much
time arguing against a “binary” divide between deniers and acknowledgers
of climate change, but his discussion is organized by a counter-opposition of
ideologies—of those who support or critique “Western modernity.” Jacques ac-
knowledges, “the basics of climate change is certainly political in the sense that
Goeminne notes,” but defends his own ideology because, unlike climate denial,
it has been subjected to “scrutiny… corroboration and revision.”
But this view too has its exclusions.
Exclusions Within Critiques of Denial
Jacques links climate science with a criticism of “the possessive individualistic
ontology of the West.” He also presents climate science in terms where “denial”
can only occur through an ideological opposition to this criticism, or because
some people still don’t know about climate science. This argument brings two
important exclusions. The ªrst is to reduce political discussion about alternative
forms of economic growth. The second is to reduce the deªnition of the risks
posed by climate change to something that is expressed sufªciently when one
admits that human activities contribute to atmospheric greenhouse gas concen-
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trations. Both of these exclusions reduce the diversity of options for understand-
ing climate change risks.
One common response—and one used by some skeptics—is to avoid the
question of whether climate change is anthropogenic, but instead ask whether
the costs of potential climate change policies are justiªed given the continued
uncertainty of what climate change impacts will be. One British skeptic wrote:
“It’s not people on my side of the debate who want to ravage the countryside
with wind farms (with no provision for decommissioning them), rein in eco-
nomic growth, introduce wartime-style rationing, raise taxes, destroy farmland
and rainforests to create biofuels.”3 Of course, this comment makes its own set
of simpliªcations, but the point is that it is not climate science that is being de-
nied, but the implications of what accepting climate science uncritically might
bring.
More generally, however, both of these exclusions affect poorer and devel-
oping countries. Climate change impacts are not simply driven by atmospheric
greenhouse gas concentrations, but are mediated by adaptive capacity, diversity
of livelihoods, and ability to respond. Industrialization and economic growth
are important ways to develop that capacity. Here, it is not the greenhouse gas
concentrations that constitute the risk, but the inability to reduce social
vulnerability.
As Goeminne acknowledges, Agarwal and Narain’s classic Global Warming
in an Unequal World4 highlighted how science, tout court, hides the political
struggle underlying the identiªcation of matters of concern. This important
work demonstrated that comparing national emissions statistics hide different
levels of per capita consumption; the generation of emissions for livelihoods
rather than lifestyle; the avoidance of historic emissions from developed coun-
tries; and the connections of many developing-world emissions to food security.
Jacques, on the other hand, identiªes opposition to climate change policy (and
in other publications to the Kyoto Protocol speciªcally) as evidence of climate
denial—without acknowledging the deªcits and exclusions of the Protocol in
terms of what it didn’t do for local capacity or technological upgrading in devel-
oping countries (nor indeed, for reducing emissions).5
The point is, politicizing science does not simply mean mobilizing science
for political objectives, but also seeing how political perspectives reinforce par-
tial knowledge and vice versa. This applies to the normative positions of both
climate change “deniers” and “acknowledgers.”
For this reason, the comparison with Holocaust denial seems out of place.
This shocking metaphor is used to suggest that climate change can be repre-
sented in single terms: where deniers are either motivated by ideology or simply
unaware of it. The risks from climate change, however, are not represented only
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by an “all-global, greenhouse gas concentration-based” approach to risk, but
from various speciªc climatic events that are mediated through forms of vulner-
ability and adaptive capacity. Economic growth can be one of many ways to re-
duce vulnerability. Adaptive capacity can mean reducing social vulnerability
through livelihoods and social support as well as building protective infrastruc-
ture. There needs to be more debate about how to achieve these, which is proba-
bly not helped by the singular approach to climate risk.
Jacques makes other exclusions in making “global” assumptions across di-
verse contexts. He implies that economic growth and progress are speciªcally
“Western” models, and (citing Gramsci) that “expert climate deniers are a ‘real,
organic vanguard of the upper classes’ of the global North.” Yet, economic
growth is a key concern of many developing countries, and there are various
additional theories that link the rise of “green consciousness” to class and un-
easiness at modernity in advanced societies.6 Equating economic growth with
destruction is a fast way to alienate developing countries from future climate re-
gimes. It sounds worse when the people saying this are from countries that have
already grown.
Seeking Solutions
The denial, or obstruction, of climate science and policy is difªcult to present as
the willful rejection of a morally correct position because all ideologies carry
simpliªcations and exclusions in how they shape facts and norms. Moreover,
there are existing theories of how this occurs. Cultural Theory, for example, ar-
gues that all controversies will see competing knowledge claims from different
worldviews, including “individualists” (equivalent to deniers) and “egalitari-
ans” (acknowledgers).7 More recent STS work has also highlighted how the In-
tergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and other assessments fore-
close normative questions before scientiªc reports are written.8 The purpose of
this analysis is not to deny the need for environmental policy, but to indicate
means of improving environmental governance by indicating inºuences on
knowledge.
Three speciªc conclusions seem apparent. First, climate change politics
will always invite resistance if they seek to summarize all aspects of environ-
mental risk and political imperatives under one master statement that humans
increase greenhouse gas concentrations. There are still too many additional
questions to be asked concerning how to reduce concentrations, or how to
lessen the impacts of concentrations. These questions particularly affect devel-
oping countries, where industrial growth is seen to be a right as well as a means
of reducing climate change impacts. Framing climate change under this master
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statement also invites people opposed to climate change policy to frame public
debate onto how far anthropogenic inºuence is actually “proven” in laypeople’s
terms, rather than emphasizing the precautionary principle and the array of
win–win policies that can reduce emissions in tandem with addressing other
needs.
Second, reducing scientiªc truth claims to counter-posed ideologies will
create additional exclusions by focusing on norms of acceptable social order
rather than underlying causes and consequences of climate change, and who is
vulnerable to these. The old associations between capitalism, modernity, and
environmental degradation that were made under Critical Theory in the 1960s,
which Jacques in particular evokes with his word “industria,”9 need to be re-
placed with more nuanced understandings of the complexity of environmental
change and the variety of forms of economic organization.10 There also needs to
be acknowledgment that it is not just “growth” but also social vulnerability that
cause problems.
And third, climate change policy is more likely to be effective if it ac-
knowledges diversity in environmental risks and political norms, rather than
uphold predeªned positions of moral and scientiªc authority. There can be
many reasons to criticize climate deniers, or seek to outºank them. Com-
plaining that deniers don’t share the same worldview misses the point. Political
analysis of environmental science needs to consider how science and politics
evolve together, rather than identify one or the other as dysfunctional.
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